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ABSTRACT
Trustworthy operation of industrial control systems depends on se-
cure and real-time code execution on the embedded programmable
logic controllers (PLCs). The controllers monitor and control the
critical infrastructures, such as electric power grids and health-
care platforms, and continuously report back the system status
to human operators. We present Zeus, a contactless embedded
controller security monitor to ensure its execution control flow
integrity. Zeus leverages the electromagnetic emission by the PLC
circuitry during the execution of the controller programs. Zeus’s
contactless execution tracking enables non-intrusive monitoring of
security-critical controllers with tight real-time constraints. Those
devices often cannot tolerate the cost and performance overhead
that comes with additional traditional hardware or software moni-
toring modules. Furthermore, Zeus provides an air-gap between
the monitor (trusted computing base) and the target (potentially
compromised) PLC. This eliminates the possibility of the monitor
infection by the same attack vectors.
Zeus monitors for control flow integrity of the PLC program
execution. Zeusmonitors the communications between the human-
machine interface and the PLC, and captures the control logic binary
uploads to the PLC. Zeus exercises its feasible execution paths,
and fingerprints their emissions using an external electromagnetic
sensor. Zeus trains a neural network for legitimate PLC executions,
and uses it at runtime to identify the control flow based on PLC’s
electromagnetic emissions. We implemented Zeus on a commercial
Allen Bradley PLC, which is widely used in industry, and evaluated
it on real-world control program executions. Zeus was able to
distinguish between different legitimate and malicious executions
with 98.9% accuracy and with zero overhead on PLC execution by
design.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial control systems (ICS) are fundamental parts of modern
society as they control and monitor critical infrastructures such as
electricity grids, health-care, chemical production, oil and gas refin-
ery, transportation and water treatment. Due to their importance
and large attack surfaces, they are becoming attractive targets for
malicious penetrations leading to catastrophic failures with sub-
stantive impact [29, 48] including the recent BlackEnergy worm
against Ukranian electricity grid [12]. Recently, the Stuxnet mal-
ware uploaded malicious code to programmable logic controllers
(PLCs), and physically damaged 20% of Iranian PLC-controlled
centrifuges [13]. The discovery of Duqu [7] and Havex [47] show
that such attacks are not isolated cases as they infected ICS in
more than eight countries. Some of these vulnerable controllers are
Internet-connected [11] and exposed by computer search engines
like Shodan [4]. There have been an increasing number of reports
on malicious attempts of PLC port scanning, automated PLC mal-
ware generation, modifying control system-specific protocols and
access to system diagnostics [5, 32]. Nevertheless, the ICS market
is expected to grow to $10.33 billion by 2018 [53].
There has been an increasing number of past works on embedded
systems and PLC protection. Offline formal control logic analysis
have been investigated by solutions such as TSV [34], through sym-
bolic execution and model checking mechanisms. Solutions such as
WeaselBoard [38] and CPAC [10] perform runtime PLC execution
monitoring using control logic and firmware-level reference mon-
itor implementations. Most related to our paper, there have been
attack and defense solutions that employ side-channel analyses to
either disclose secret information (e.g., cryptographic keys [17]),
or detect anomalous misbehavior (e.g., execution tracking [31]).
Side channel-based attacks require selective monitoring of only
execution points of interest, such as the encryption subroutines.
On the other hand, side channel-based defenses have to monitor
throughout the execution looking for anomalies.
In this paper, we present Zeus, a contactless PLC control flow
integrity monitor that monitors the program execution by ana-
lyzing the PLC’s runtime electromagnetic (EM) emanation side
channel. Given a PLC controller program, Zeus profiles the PLC’s
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electromagnetic emanation during the execution of feasible paths
of the legitimate program. Zeus pre-processes the signal traces and
uses them offline to train a neural network model. The model is
later used during the runtime operation to either determine the
fine-grained control flow of the execution based on the real-time
EM emanations or declare unknown (malicious) code execution.
Contactless monitoring enables Zeus to ensure security of cru-
cial controllers in mission-critical applications with tight real-time
constraints. The operators are often very reluctant to instrument
those controllers’ software stack with additional security probes
that cause performance overhead and hurt the underlying real-time
guarantees. Additionally, from security viewpoint, contactless mon-
itoring keeps Zeus away from the attack vectors that target the
controllers because of the introduced air gap between the moni-
tor and the victim controller. Other side channel-based techniques
such as power signal analyses draw and monitor current from con-
trollers’ circuitry. In contrast, Zeus is completely non-intrusive and
passive; it does not require any instrumentation of the controller
and does not affect its electronics.
Zeus monitors all the network links bound to the PLC, and cap-
tures the control logic uploads by the human-machine interface
(HMI) servers that are sent for execution on the PLC. Zeus exercises
various code segments of the binary while capturing the electro-
magnetic emanations. Zeus profiles the control logic on the PLC
with deactivated output modules to ensure the underlying physi-
cal process (actuators) are not affected during the training phase.
The training is implemented in two stages. First, Zeus executes
control logic symbolically1 and removes infeasible paths. Through
counterexample guided inductive synthesis [49], Zeus generates
different test inputs for each execution path, and trains a neural
network based on the corresponding electromagnetic emanation.
The trained neural network allows Zeus to detect the execution of
an illegitimate control flow and/or malicious code injection.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We present a new execution control flow tracking solution
for embedded PLC controllers that enables security monitor-
ing with air-gapped electromagnetic sensors.
• We develop an online signal processing framework to ana-
lyze the electromagnetic signals and extract minimal feature
set necessary for execution integrity monitoring.
• We evaluated Zeus using an inexpensive sensor against
widely-used control programs, e.g., proportional-integral-
derivative (PID) controllers, on commercial Allen Bradley
PLC devices (most popular in North America) with ARM
Cortex-M3 processors. Zeus detects malicious code injec-
tions with 98.9% accuracy in real-world settings.
Overview and Organization. In Section 2, we explain our as-
sumptions about the adversaries and their capabilities. In Section 3,
we provide a brief background on programmable logic controllers
and their typical configurations as well as neural networks that
Zeus employs for program behavioral modeling. In Section 4, we
discuss about the electromagnetic signals emitted by the PLCs and
1Complete symbolic execution of embedded PLC control logic programs is often
feasible as they are mostly not branch-heavy in practice.
how they characterize the program execution.We discuss how Zeus
generates training data points for program behavioral modeling and
transforms the signal traces into spectrum sequences. In Section 5,
we present our fine-grained emanation analysis model, where a
neural network model of the legitimate program control flows is
constructed and trained using electromagnetic emanation signals.
In Section 6, we present our empirical evaluations of Zeus’s various
components on ten real-world PLC programs and attack scenarios
similar to Stuxnet [13]. In Section 7, we review the recent most
related work in the literature, and finally, we conclude the paper in
Section 8.
2 THREAT MODEL
One of the most prominent security failure causes in control sys-
tems using PLCs is the failure to guard PLCs against remote pro-
gramming [60]. PLC programmer machines are most often based
on commodity operating systems, and often lag security update
releases by months [54]. In the following, we state the assumptions
made on the security measures that must be successfully in place
for Zeus to function correctly.
We assume there is some trusted path from Zeus to system op-
erators to alert them of any malicious executions. Unlike software-
based solutions, Zeus’s contactless monitoring enables secure mon-
itoring even if the software stack below the PLC’s control logic (e.g.,
firmware or operating system) is compromised. The PLC-bound
network link used to transfer the control logic programs for ex-
ecution is assumed to be trusted. This allows Zeus to obtain a
legitimate copy of the control logic to compare with the runtime
PLC executions for control flow integrity checks. Zeus does not
assume source code availability and works with binaries.
Zeus defends against control channel attacks (e.g., Stuxnet [13]),
where the adversaries upload arbitrary and potentially malicious
control logic on the PLC for execution. More specifically, the types
of control logic attacks that Zeus can protect against are i)modified
control logic such as injection, removal, and replacement of code
segments in the legitimate control logic program; and ii) hijacked
control flow of the legitimate control logic execution through net-
work exploits (e.g., code reuse attacks2 such as return-oriented
programming). Zeus does not defend against sensor channel at-
tacks, where sensor data is forged by compromised sensors. In such
a case, the control logic may behave exactly as intended, but on
false sensor data [30]. Additionally, Zeus itself may be attacked by
external signal jammers leading to false positives. However, this
would not affect the integrity of the control logic execution on the
PLC.
3 BACKGROUND
Programmable Logic Controllers. Programmable logic con-
trollers are multiple-input-multiple-output computers. They have
input and output modules to interact with the physical world (plant)
2Protection against control flow and code reuse attacks are simpler in PLCs compared
to conventional computers, because the PLCs’ restrictive and more primitive program-
ming languages (e.g., type safe and no indirect call sites) allows deterministic modeling
of the legitimate control flows.
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to monitor and control critical infrastructures such as manufactur-
ing, robotics, and avionics. The PLC’s input modules are connected
to sensors within the plant and receive measurements about the
plant’s status continuously. The PLC’s output modules are con-
nected to plant actuators and convey the commands to control it.
The PLC converts sensor readings into digital values, process the
readings with the built-in computing unit, and forward the outputs
to the physical world. The logical behavior of PLCs (i.e., the process-
ing of the input data) is programmable. The control logic programs
are developed by the control system operators on human-machine-
interface (HMI) servers that are connected to the PLCs through
network links. Once developed, the control logic is compiled and
sent to the PLC for execution. The program is executed repeatedly
in fixed intervals, called scan cycles. During each scan cycle, the
control logic program reads input values from memory and stores
the output values to memory. The PLC firmware is responsible
for the interchange of these updated values to and from the PLC’s
input/output ports to interface the physical world. The firmware
also implements the reporting mechanisms such as the LED display
on the device and real-time data transfers to the HMI about the
plant’s current status.
Deep Neural Networks. Neural network is a class of supervised
learning models that tries to learn the complex nonlinear mapping
between input data and their targets (e.g. class labels). A basic neural
network unit architecture consists of a linear mapping followed by
an activation:
y = σ (Wx + b), (1)
where x is the input feature vector, andW represents the weight
matrix. σ is the activation function. It is a nonlinear function that
models the complex relation between input x and output y. Com-
mon activation functions include sigmoid [26], rectified linear unit
(ReLU) [64], tanh, etc. Figure 1 shows a graphical illustration of
Equation 1. The edges between the Input layer and the hidden layer
represents the weightsW ,b. Since each node in the input layer is
fully connected with all nodes in the hidden layer, such unit is also
called a dense layer.
A neural network can go large, which is increasing number of
nodes in the hidden layer, or go deep, which is stacking multiple
network units together (increasing number of hidden layers), such
that more complex nonlinear mappings between data and targets
can be learned. All forms of artificial neural networks essentially
follow the aforementioned basic architecture. Zeus utilizes recur-
rent neural network (RNN) [46] to model the execution behavior
of PLC programs (Section 5).
For training, the data samples, each with a corresponding label,
are fed to the network’s input layer. The network is trained to learn
discriminative features from samples by itself. This completely
data driven approach, compared to traditional hand crafted feature
extraction methods, leads to much simpler-to-use and more reliable
outcomes in practice. In our experiments (Section 6), we empirically
show that RNNs overcome traditional techniques such as hidden
Markov models (HMMs) in terms of PLC execution monitoring
accuracy and performance.
… … …
Input x Hidden layer Onput y
Figure 1: A basic neural network unit architecture.
Neural networks can be trained in an iterative manner using the
gradient descent algorithm [63]. At each iteration, all input data
are passed through the network. The output are compared with
their corresponding targets t . A loss function l is defined between
the network output y and the expected target on each data sample:
li = loss(yi , ti ), (2)
The loss function measures the difference between the current
and target outputs. Zeus uses mean square error (MSE) as the loss
function. The total loss is the sum over individual losses of all the
data samples:
l =
N∑
i=1
li , (3)
where N represents the total number of data samples. Computing
the total loss is called the forward pass. To update weights or pa-
rameters of the network, partial derivatives of the total loss with
respect to all weights are calculated to identify their maximal de-
scending direction using back propagation. All weights are updated
accordingly (the backward pass). Forward and backward passes
are repeated iteratively until the values converge. The resulting
network is able to produce outputs close to the expected targets.
4 PLC PROGRAM EMANATION ANALYSIS
During the PLC code execution, the processor clock frequency
and switching of the underlying CMOS devices along with the
power regulation board result in change of electric current in the
PLC circuitry. The current produces time-varying magnetic field
that interacts with the electric field leading to an electromagnetic
(EM) wave. The EM wave propagates perpendicular to electric
and magnetic fields [1]. In order to radiate this EM emanation, an
antenna is required. The components on the PLC’s printed circuit
board (PCB) act as antennas. The transmission range of these waves
increases with the increase in the surface area of the antenna. These
emanations from the PLC boards can be captured by an external
electromagnetic sensor placed near the emanation source.
Zeus uses these near-field EM waves as the PLC side channel,
because they leak information about the program running on the de-
vice [16]. Different instructions usually expose different emanation
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Figure 2: Zeus’s control flow integrity monitoring.
patterns. Thus, the collected electromagnetic signal traces during
program executions have unique local characteristics depending
on the runtime control flows. This observation is utilized by Zeus
to fingerprint the side-channels of legitimate program executions
and identify unknown (malicious) code injections and/or control
flow hijacking attempts.
Recent attempts have been made to monitor micro-controllers
such as STC89C52 [31] and PIC16F687 [9] based on power signal
analysis [9, 31] that require physical manipulation of the circuits for
sensor placement. The data acquisition draws current from the con-
troller boards potentially affecting its functionalities that triggers a
red flag for practical deployment in controllers for mission-critical
real-time operations. In comparison, Zeus’s contactless, passive
and non-intrusive monitoring of commercial PLC ARM processors
using an inexpensive EM sensor for control flow integrity is a more
challenging endeavor.
Due to the PLC architecture, the execution times of individual
instructions are not fixed to the processor’s clock cycle. A list of
estimated completion times for instructions is provided in the user
manual. However, in practice based on our observations, even the
execution time of a single instruction varies across different execu-
tion runs of the same PLC code. This makes the signal analysis using
time-based truncation infeasible. Being contactless, Zeus has to
deal with a large amount of signal noise. Our collected electromag-
netic signal traces have very low signal to noise ratio (SNR) such
that repeatable local patterns along the execution paths (leveraged
by [31]) cannot be observed in the time domain.
To deal with these problems, Zeus borrows ideas from speech
recognition research [45]. Zeus looks at frequency representations
of signal sections within a local slidingwindow. Zeus extracts signal
segments via a slidingwindow on the collected signal. Each segment
consist of several consecutive instructions. Zeus then computes the
power spectral density of each segment.
Unlike time domain signals, we observed that the patterns in
the frequency representations are much more stable and robust to
noise. This is because the local spectra (spectrum sequence) are
computed through weighted summation of all time signal points
within the window. Hence, the white noise is not cumulated, while
the underlying desired deterministic signal is. Therefore, a sequence
of local spectra extracted from the PLC code execution EM signal
trace includes repeatable patterns to characterize individual execu-
tion paths. Zeus deploys the aforementioned analysis to model the
execution behavior of target PLC programs.
For completeness of the results, signal traces of all feasible con-
trol flows of the program are collected. Zeus monitors the network
link between the HMI servers and the PLC controllers, and in-
tercepts the control logic uploads to the PLC. Through symbolic
execution [34], the execution path predicates are aggregated and
checked by an SMT solver for satisfiability. Consequently, infeasible
executable paths are eliminated.
For each remaining feasible path, Zeus calculates several con-
crete test cases through counterexample-guided inductive synthe-
sis [49]. More specifically, to calculate the first test case for a path,
its aggregated path condition expressed as a conjunctive logical
expression φp = (φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φn )) is fed to the SMT solver. The
solvers produces a concrete input value set (e.g., i = 20). Calculat-
ing the second concrete input for the same path involves feeding
φp ∧¬φi to the SMT solver, where φi := (I == 20) and ¬ represents
logical negation. The next concrete inputs are calculated similarly.
Zeus runs the program on the PLC using the generated test cases
for each execution path, and collects the electromagnetic emana-
tions using an external sensor. The collected signal traces along
with their labels (corresponding control flows) are fed to a sequence
neural network classifier for training. All these steps are performed
offline. During the runtime, Zeus’s external sensor collects the
PLC’s emanations and employs the classifier to determine whether
the signal trace belongs to the feasible legitimate execution paths. A
modified execution path (e.g., a maliciously injected PLC program)
will lead to a change in electromagnetic emanations away from the
samples observed by the classifier during the training phase. The
deviation triggers a red flag by the classifier, and the execution is
marked as malicious.
4
5 EM-BASED CONTROL FLOWMONITORING
There have been works utilizing electromagnetic side channel sig-
nals to detect abnormal executions [51]. They follow a template
matching scheme, where the query signal is compared with all
constructed templates of the execution paths. Based on our experi-
ments, such time domain-based signal matching techniques cannot
distinguish fine-grained characteristics of complex program con-
trol flows accurately. To address this, Zeus constructs a sequential
neural network classification model of pre-processed frequency
domain data samples. The model therefore learns from control flow
transitions from the training frequency data and encodes them
in its network weights. This model describes the behavior of the
program.
Zeus maps the control flow transitions of any new legitimate
data sequence with the learned transitions, modeled by the neural
network, and determines a specific control flow that the observa-
tions correspond to. A data sequence with abnormal components
such as unseen segments (due to code injection attacks) or invalid
transitions between segments (due to control flow hijacking) will
causemismatches. Suchmismatches accumulate along the sequence,
cause the neural network states and thus the output of the model
to deviate from expected values.
Figure 2 shows Zeus’s work flow. During the offline training
stage, each collected signal trace is transformed into a spectrum
sequence (Section 4). The sequence neural network model is trained
using spectrum sequences of all classes (legitimate control flows).
After deployment, Zeus feeds the online spectrum sequences of
collected query signal traces into the trained model. This results
in a probability distribution computed by the model over all the
classes. The class with the highest score is compared to a predefined
threshold. If the score exceeds the threshold, Zeus assigns it to the
query signal trace as the execution path that the program is taking
currently. If the threshold check fails, it indicates a mismatch be-
tween the query signal trace and the trained model. Consequently,
Zeus triggers an alert about an illegitimate control flow. Zeus pro-
vides more fine-grained reports about the mismatch regarding the
execution point that the real-time control flow deviated from the
legitimate expected flows. This information can be used later for
detailed vulnerability discovery, e.g., how the control flow was hi-
jacked. We consider the vulnerability analysis phase outside the
scope of this paper.
5.1 Offline Model Construction and Training
To construct the classification model with sequential inputs, we use
a long term short memory (LSTM) network layer [18]. LSTM is a
variation of the recurrent neural network (RNN) used for modeling
sequential data. LSTM takes a sequence of inputs and maintains a
hidden state vector along the sequence. This fits Zeus’s use-case,
where the observables are EM signals, while the hidden states rep-
resent the underlying unobserved code segments and basic blocks.
At each time step of the input sequence, current hidden state
vector is computed based on both the previous hidden state vector
and the current input. The hidden state carries long term depen-
dency between time steps. This enables Zeus to capture contextual
information in the sequential control flow transitions.
Let [x1,x2, ...,xN ] be a spectrum sequence computed for a col-
lected EM signal trace. xt indicates the input in the sequence at
time t . The vector size N depends on the execution time of the
control flow. The current hidden state ht can be computed as:
ht = ot ∗ tanh(ct ), (4)
where tanh is the hyperbolic tangent activation function; ∗ denotes
the entry-wise product; ot is the output gate vector; and ct is the
cell state vector. The two vectors can be computed as:
ot = sigmoid(Woxt +Uoht−1 + bo )
ct = ft ∗ ct−1 + it ∗ tanh(Wcxt +Ucht−1 + bc ). (5)
In Equation 5,Wo ,Uo ,bo ,Wc ,Uc ,bc are the weights of the neural
network units. Note that the design extends the basic network archi-
tecture described in Section 3. ct−1 andht−1 are state vectors passed
from the previous time step. ft and it represent the forget and input
gate vectors, respectively. These vectors are designed to keep only
useful contextual information and acquire new information:
ft = sigmoid(Wf xt +Uf ht−1 + bf )
it = sigmoid(Wixt +Uixt + bi ), (6)
whereWf ,Uf ,bf ,Wi ,Ui ,bi are the unit weights. We add a dense
layer followed by a softmax function after the output of the LSTM
layer at the last time stephN . This maps the network to a probability
distribution over all legitimate control flows in the PLC code.
p = softmax(WhN + b), (7)
where the height the weight matrixW is the same as number of
legitimate control flows.
Intuitively, the neural network model output is a one-hot [55]
vector q. It has a 1 on its entry that corresponds to the identified
control flow and 0s on all its other entries. q can also be viewed as
a probability distribution. We define the loss function of our model
as the cross entropy between the model’s actual output p and the
target vector q. The resulting cross entropy measures the difference
between two probability distributions:
l = −
∑
i
pi logqi , (8)
where i is the index of the legitimate control flows. The total loss of
our model is the sum of losses over all the training EM spectrum se-
quences and their corresponding class labels (control flows). During
the training, weights of the model are tuned iteratively as described
in Section 2. A well-trained model will have its output probability
distribution very close to its corresponding one-hot vector, and the
output distribution will bias remarkably towards the corresponding
control flow.
The overall architecture of Zeus’s network model is shown in
Figure 3. The size of the hidden state vector ht can be increased
to carry more information along the sequence. Moreover, multiple
5
……
… … … …
…Spectrum sequence
LSTM layer
Stacked LSTM layer
Dense layer
Softmax layer
Figure 3: Network architecture of proposed model.
LSTM can be stacked to be more capable of characterizing the EM
spectrum sequences for PLC execution classification. However both
adjustments increase the computational complexity. To ensure effi-
cient online classification, we kept the network model size minimal
as long as it did not affect Zeus’s accuracy of malicious execution
detection.
The collected electromagnetic signals suffer from random pertur-
bations caused by EM interference of other components on the PLC
device. To reduce the noise effect, Zeus provides the neural network
model training with many EM signal traces for each control flow.
This is possible through Zeus’s PLC code analysis and generation
of several test-cases for each feasible execution path. Consequently,
the neural network training algorithm receive many traces with
the same label (control flow) each incorporating random noise. This
enables the neural network’s data-driven feature extractions proce-
dures to train its unit weights based on the main signal ignoring
the noise margins.
5.2 Online PLC Execution Monitoring
Zeus uses the trained model at runtime to detect anomalous exe-
cutions. EM spectrum sequences from legitimate executions will
have their network outputs distribution heavily biased towards the
corresponding class label. The class with the highest probability
will be reported as the identified control flow I :
I = argmax
i
pi , (9)
and its likelihood score can be calculated as L = maxi pi . L repre-
sents how likely this signal trace belongs to the legitimate PLC code.
In the case of correct classification outcome, the network’s input
transitions match with the corresponding control flow transitions
of the PLC control logic and the desired network state is maintained
as the most likely state along the input EM trace.
Malicious control flows constitute either execution of a mali-
ciously injected new code or code reuse attacks that execute the
available instructions while deviating from legitimate control flows
at some point. The introduced new instructions or the control flow
deviation cause a mismatch between the observed EM signals and
the neural network’s learned transitions. This reduces the bias
in the neural network model’s calculated probability distribution
increasing its entropy. Therefore, by setting a threshold on the
likelihood score L, abnormal executions can be identified as they
match none of the known legitimate control flows.
Let H0(H1) indicate the legitimate (malicious) execution, the
detection problem can be expressed as:
L
H1
≶
H0
ε, (10)
where ε is the preset threshold.
For malicious executions, Zeus can also locate the point, where
PLC execution deviated from the legitimate flows. Let h =
[hn1,hn2, · · · ,hnN ] be the hidden state sequence of the n-th LSTM
layer of our model for a query EM spectrum sequence input for a
malicious execution. Let’s also assume Zeus identifies the hidden
state sequence hI = [hIn1,hIn2, · · · ,hInM ] as the most likely legit-
imate control flow that corresponds to a given query EM trace.
The deviation point can be located by computing the distance dt
between the two sequences at each time step t :
dt =
√
(hnt − hInt )2. (11)
The deviation of the PLC execution from the legitimate control
flows is reflected in the sudden change of signal traces and thus
the neural network inputs. A changed spectrum input will cause
its corresponding hidden state vector to move away from its ex-
pected vector in the state space. Therefore, a sudden step increase
in the distance sequence [d1,d2, · · · ] indicates the point, where the
deviation happens.
6 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We evaluated Zeus on real-world settings with commercial PLC
devices and using legitimate and malicious control logics. We first
describe our experimental setup including the signal acquisition
system and the target PLC model. We will discuss the results on the
electromagnetic emanations of the target PLC and their discrim-
inative spectrum characteristics. We measure Zeus’s accuracy in
classifying legitimate control flows, and detecting malicious execu-
tions. We compare Zeus’s data-driven approach with traditional
model-based solutions using hidden Markov models [31] We finally
test the performance of Zeus on several real applications. An Intel
i7-6800K CPU was used to compute frequency representations, and
HMM training and testing. Our LSTM neural network model was
trained on an NVIDIA GTX1080 GPU.
6.1 Experimental Setup
Figure 4 shows our signal recording setup that consists of a record-
ing probe and an amplifier. The corresponding test-bed configura-
tion and component interconnection is shown in Figure 5. In our
experiments, we used the Allen Bradley 1769-L18ER-BB1B Com-
pactLogix PLC (with ARM Cortex-M3 processor). Allen Bradley
PLCs are the most popular and widely used controllers in many
industrial control systems in North America. We used an AKG-P170
condenser microphone without the acoustic capsule or transducer
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Figure 4: Experimental setup including the PLC, external
sensing probe, the amplifier, and the sampling oscilloscope.
Target 
PLC 
model
EM 
sensor Amplifier
Signal 
acquisition
Figure 5: Experimentation test-bed configuration for electro-
magnetic (EM) side channel analysis.
Figure 6: AKG P170 condenser microphone without trans-
ducer serving as an electromagnetic probe.
(Figure 6) as an antenna to receive the electromagnetic emana-
tion3. We also tried a Langer LF-R 400 passive antenna. However,
we achieved the best signal sensitivity from the AKG-P170 micro-
phone. This is because the AKG-P170 microphone together with
the phantom power supply can be viewed as an active antenna.
Active antennas have better sensitivities than passive antennas,
since signals are pre-amplified.
3When the acoustic capsule is detached from the microphone, the remaining part of
the microphone serves as an antenna since the coil in the microphone is sufficiently
long to receive the signals emitted from the board.
We used an HP-461A amplifier to increase the signal strength.
We observed that most of the informative frequency variations
appear below 5 MHz. Accordingly, we set our sampling rate to
preserve most frequency information while maintaining a moder-
ate computation complexity for online malicious code detection
performance.
6.2 PLC Electromagnetic Emanations
We performed numerous tests and inspected various regions of
the three PLC PCB boards to identify the point that emits the
most distinguishable EM signals. Once that point was identified,
we adjusted our directional EM probe to focus on the point while
collecting the EM emanations for our experiments.
Figure 7a shows the components that we mainly investigated.
The main sources of emanation were the proprietary Allen Bradley
chip, the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) and the surface
mount device (SMD) capacitors on PLC’s communication PCB
board. The SMD capacitors are involved in the voltage regulation
for the chips. Figure 7b shows the strength of the corresponding
emanation from each point. Since the surface area of the SMD
capacitors is very small, the corresponding emission was rather
weak. The surface area of the Allan Bradley chip is relatively larger,
and hence the corresponding emission was stronger. We proceeded
by focusing on that chip for our following experiments. Figure 7c
shows how the captured signal appears with as the probe-chip dis-
tance increases. The EM signals were collected by the probe located
0.1 cm away from the proprietary chip.
We investigated the differences among the EM emanations from
the PLC execution of different instruction types. Different PLC
instructions have different execution times and computation com-
plexities thus different power consumptions that is reflected in
the emanation signals as discriminative spectral patterns. Figure 8
shows the results. These spectral pattern types are the core basis
for Zeus’s design.
Figure 8 visualizes the discriminative spectral patterns of differ-
ent PLC instructions. PLC’s (ARM) ISA include 22 different types
of instructions. We show the results for only the 16 types that are
commonly used in PLC programs4. Modules involving complicated
computations, such as PID5 were also tested. Figure 8 shows that
different instructions give rise to EM signals with different inten-
sities at different frequencies. Zeus exploits these fingerprints to
estimate the PLC’s internal runtime execution state and dynamic
control flow using the collected EM emanations.
We further verify our visual observations by performing a classi-
fication validation on spectra of emanation signals of these instruc-
tions using the random decision forests algorithm [23]. We used
Weka [22] to implement the classifier. One instruction of each in-
struction type (Figure 8) was tested. An emanation signal of 200 µs
was collected under sampling rate of 50MHz and transformed into
spectrum representation. 1000 such signal traces were collected for
4The instructions include arithmetic instructions (ADD, MUL, DIV, DEG), advanced
math instructions (LN, SIN, XPY, STD), comparing instructions (XOR, GRT), array
manipulation instructions (BSL, AVE, FLL) and control instructions (TON, JMP).
5This PLC programmingmodule implements the proportional-integral-derivative (PID)
control algorithm [2].
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Table 1: Confusion matrix for the classification.
ADD SIN XOR BSL JMP PID
ADD 78.63% (747) 5.26% (50) 8.21% (78) 1.58% (15) 4.95% (47) 1.37% (13)
SIN 5.36% (56) 83.54% (873) 5.65% (59) 1.05% (11) 2.39% (25) 2.01% (21)
XOR 8.13% (75) 7.48% (69) 69.31% (639) 0.11% (1) 12.47% (115) 2.49% (23)
BSL 1.24% (12) 1.65% (16) 0.10% (1) 95.24% (921) 0.21% (2) 1.55% (15)
JMP 5.44% (53) 3.29% (32) 12.32% (120) 0.21% (2) 76.49% (745) 2.26% (22)
PID 0.32% (3) 2.11% (20) 2.64% (25) 0.21% (2) 1.27% (12) 93.46% (886)
each instruction type to train the classifier, and the same number
of traces were collected for validation testing.
Table 1 shows the classification confusion matrix. Most signals
are correctly classified correctly as their actual instruction type.
This shows that the spectral patterns of different types of instruc-
tions are indeed discriminative and can be used for control flow
integrity monitoring.
Zeus applies a sliding window to the collected emanation signals.
Because of various instruction execution times, sliding windows
of the same length at different points of the signal cover different
combinations and number of instructions. This helps for spectral
patterns of the signal segments within different windows across
the signal trace to be distinguishable. Therefore, the spectra of
these local signal segments characterize the emanation signals,
the execution paths. Zeus utilizes this to construct the program
behavior model.
Figure 9a shows the EM emanation (between seconds 6 and 12)
while a control logic program is installed for execution on the PLC.
The visible EM emanation pattern can be used to detect runtime
(malicious) control logic uploads similar to Stuxnet [13]. Figure 9b
shows the electromagnetic emanation patterns during the PLC’s
boot-up process. These patterns can be used to detect when the
PLC is remotely rebooted by an adversary.
6.3 Accuracy
We evaluated Zeus for PLC execution monitoring, control flow
classification of ten real applications, and detection of malicious
code executions. We computed spectrum sequences and estimated
the power spectral density of signal segments. The segments were
extracted using sliding windows of size 200µs , with 90% overlap
between successive windows.
A stacked two-layer LSTM network with 100 nodes on both
layers was employed to fingerprint the execution behavior of each
program. We trained the network using stochastic gradient descent
(SGD). An average of 50 epochs (iterations) were required for the
network to converge on the tested programs.We obtained 100 traces
for every feasible control flow of each program for training the
model. For each program, a 2-fold cross validation was performed
10 times to stabilize the result.
We chose ten real PLC programs from different application do-
mains for evaluation purposes. Table 2 lists the control logics along
with their functionalities. These programs fall in the classes of
vector arithmetic, numerical methods, control algorithms, cryptog-
raphy, signal processing and communications.
Comparison with HMM solutions. We compared our LSTM
network model with a traditional hidden Markov model (HMM)
based program behavior modeling approach [31]. For the HMM, the
observations were defined as the signal segment or its frequency
representation. HMM state was defined as unique samples in the
observation set. The number of HMM states was defined as a ad-
justable parameter. We set the HMM number of symbols to be 100.
We fit the observations of each state with a multivariate Gaussian
distribution. The parameter set (HMM’s transition probabilities,
observation models and initial probabilities) was estimated using
Baum-Welch algorithm [35]. We used the forward algorithm [45]
to calculate the observation sequence likelihoods. We will present
the accuracy results for both Zeus and HMM solutions below.
We evaluated Zeus accuracy from two aspects: i) execution mon-
itoring - to determine the control flow of a running legitimate PLC
code, and ii) malicious execution detection - to detect the control
flows that are not a part of the legitimate program. Table 3 shows the
execution monitoring accuracy results. We evaluated Zeus (LSTM)
with both pre-processed spectrum traces (Freq) and raw time do-
main signals (Time) and compared the results with HMM-based
solutions. LSTM using the frequency representation (Freq-LSTM)
achieves almost perfect results on all the evaluated programs.
LSTM’s better results in comparison with HMM-based solutions
can be explained by the following two observations. First, theZeus’s
LSTMnetwork architecture is able to capture long-term dependency
in the input sequence. This contextual information corresponds
to the control flows of the program, and hence is essential in dis-
tinguishing different execution paths. HMM models, on the other
hand, assume only 1st order data dependency in the sequence, and
hence miss a lot of useful information.
Second, Zeus’s model is able to extract discriminative features
from the input due to its stacked multi layer architecture. This con-
tributes to the classification performance. For HMM, however, the
input data is directly used for parameter estimation without any
feature extraction. When raw signal segments are used as inputs,
both LSTM and HMM are not able to achieve good performance (Ta-
ble 3). This is because raw time signals contain lots of noise, so the
underlying signal characteristics cannot be recognized and hence
learned by the two models. The frequency representation, however,
reveals the signal characteristics as the noise (low frequency) stays
far from the main signal (high frequency).
For detection of malicious executions, Figure 10 shows the like-
lihood scores L (Section 5.2) of positive (abnormal) and negative
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Table 2: Evaluation programs and descriptions.
Class Name Description Example applications Average length (msec)
Vector arithmetic Matrix Matrix multiplication Sensor array data processing 3.3
Q-sort Quick sort Value searching, element uniqueness 2.1
Numerical methods GD Gradient descent Power flow optimization 5
Newton Newton’s method Vehicle trajectory estimation 3.5
Signal processing Conv Convolution Signal filtering 9.2
DCT Discrete cosine transform Audio lossy compression 17.3
Communications Dijkstra Dijkstra’s algorithm Routing optimization in smart grid 11.3
Cryptography AES AES-128 encryption Data protection, access control 18.1
Control systems PID PID control Vehicle cruise control 6.5
Patfilt particle filter Object Tracking, localization estimation 2.5
(normal) samples for two example applications, namely Newton-
Raphson numerical method and AES encryption algorithm. Note
the negative samples tend to concentrate within a small range,
while the positive samples are more spread out. This is because
the number of control flows with each program is finite, and each
control flow is well recognized by our network through training.
Thus, the signal traces of the legitimate control flows match closely
with the LSTM model. The malicious programs can take any arbi-
trary control flow especially in the case of malicious code injection
attacks; therefore, their matching degree vary a lot.
Figure 11 shows the ROC curve for the frequency and time do-
main data using Zeus’s LSTM and HMM solutions. The numbers
are average over all the ten applications. Zeus (LSTM) using the
frequency traces achieves almost perfect detection performance.
Steeper ROC curve indicates better separation of positive and nega-
tive samples, and thus better performance. This is usually measured
by the area under the curve (AUC). AUC is usually between 0.5
(random guess) and 1 (perfect separation). Table 4 shows the AUC
for each target PLC program and each evaluation setup. The stacked
multi-layer architecture of Zeus’s network model captures impor-
tant information both from the hidden states and the inputs, and
carries it along the sequence. This results in better learning of the
program behavior from the signal traces.
Note the HMMusing the raw time domain signal performs worse
than random guessing (diagonal line on ROC - Figure 11). This is
because HMM, due to its limited first order dependency assumption,
is not able to characterize the temporal behavior of the signal traces
well. Additionally, noisy raw time domain signal traces further
contribute to its randomness and poor accuracy.
We intentionally reduced the convergence threshold for the neu-
ral network’s training that led to larger number of training itera-
tions. The main reason is Zeus’s goal to detect malicious executions
and not only to classify (previously seen) legitimate control flows.
The increased number of iterations resulted in more discriminatory
classification outcomes, i.e., more biased probability distribution
over the classes (legitimate control flows) and larger likelihood
score L. Hence, we were able to increase the classification threshold
ε as well (Equation 10). Consequently, in the presence of malicious
control flows, Zeus’s likelihood score L did not exceed ε . Hence, the
flows were classified as malicious correctly. This reduced Zeus’s
false negative and positive rates.
Table 3: Classification accuracy of all evaluation programs
over four evaluation settings.
Program Time_HMM Time_LSTM Freq_HMM Freq_LSTM
Matrix 55% 52% 60% 100%
Q-sort 49% 60% 41% 100%
GD 40% 64% 40% 98%
Newton 48% 51% 63% 100%
Conv 57% 69% 56% 100%
DCT 53% 45% 51% 94%
Dijkstra 62% 72% 65% 100%
AES 50% 50% 67% 98%
PID 40% 62% 71% 99%
Patfilt 51% 45% 67% 100%
Table 4: Area under curve (AUC) of all evaluated programs
over all four evaluation settings.
Program Time_HMM Time_LSTM Freq_HMM Freq_LSTM
Matrix 0.34 0.52 0.90 0.99
Q-sort 0.52 0.48 0.76 1.00
GD 0.24 0.55 0.86 0.98
Newton 0.25 0.62 0.86 0.99
Conv 0.62 0.65 0.81 0.99
DCT 0.14 0.61 0.81 0.99
Dijkstra 0.44 0.51 0.85 1.00
AES 0.56 0.57 0.82 0.96
PID 0.34 0.66 0.79 1.00
Patfilt 0.22 0.73 0.87 0.99
Sliding window size. We investigated the influence of various
sliding window sizes on Zeus accuracy. By using window of dif-
ferent sizes, Zeus essentially looks into the program execution at
different granularities. A smaller window can capture finer grained
transitions in the signal trace, but the frequency resolution of the
spectra will be lower. This results in a less discriminative repre-
sentation of the signal segments. Smaller windows also result in
longer data sequence, therefore more recurrences of Zeus’s neural
network model. This makes the model less robust to random per-
turbations, since biases on the network states accumulate through
the recurrences. A larger window size, on the other hand, will have
spectra of better frequency resolution and better robustness, but
some small transitions in the signal trace will be ignored.
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Figure 7: EM emanation by the PLC’s communication board.
Figure 12 shows how sliding window size affects Zeus accuracy
(Figure 12a) and AUC (Figure 12b) both averaged on all ten applica-
tions. Using frequency data with a LSTM classifier outperforms all
the other settings for all the window sizes. When the size of sliding
window increases, both the classification and detection accuracy
degrade because of the ignored useful transient information (as
discussed above). Too small windows also cause accuracy degrada-
tion because of the resulting lower frequency resolution and less
discriminative spectra.
6.4 Performance
We measured the time requirements to complete Zeus’s classifica-
tion of the collected EM traces. The required time includes the time
of computing the spectrum sequence from the raw time domain EM
signal trace if frequency representation is employed, and the time
of passing the data sequence through the trained neural network
model to get the prediction.
Figure 13 shows the average processing time for one input signal
trace and various sliding window sizes. The numbers are averaged
over all the ten applications. All the four evaluation settings are able
to process the query signal within tens of milliseconds. LSTM-based
approaches are overall slower than HMM-based solutions, because
passing the input sequences through the network involves more
time-consuming array computations. HMM’s faster speed comes
at the cost of its remarkably lower classification and detection
accuracy.
The figure also shows that the larger sliding window sizes lead
to reduced time requirements. This is expected as the larger sliding
window produce shorter data sequences for a given EM signal trace.
Consequently, there are fewer recurrences in the neural network.
7 RELATEDWORK
We discuss related work on controller and critical infrastructure
security in terms of defense mechanisms and possible attacks.
Side channel analysis. There have been several recent works
on analyzing side channels of various modalities for the purpose
of inspecting runtime execution. On contactless monitoring, Eisen-
barth et al. [9] determine the instruction types (not instances) by
modeling individual instructions as HMM states. Msgna et al. [37]
perform similar analyses by modeling CFGs as HMMs. The au-
thors assume equal-length basic blocks that is not often the case
in practical settings. Other similar HMM-based program behavior
modeling have also been studied [15, 59, 61, 62]. On monitoring
with contact requirements, cross correlation between the side chan-
nels (power [19, 20] and RF traces [50–52]) and the program’s single
golden execution have been investigated for anomaly detection.
However, obtaining a single golden execution is not feasible in prac-
tice. A complex PLC program may go through different execution
paths depending on the inputs (sensor measurements). Vermon et
al. [58] uses power signal side channels to reverse engineer the byte-
code running on a Java smart card. Attacks to disclose substitution
tables of the A3/A8 algorithm execution [8, 40] have been proposed.
These methods focus on recovering the lookup table only. Zeus
increases the accuracy of passive side-channel analysis of complete
execution profiles using inexpensive contactless EM sensors.
The most related work [31] provides code execution tracking
based on the power signal, which requires connections to an 11
MHz 8-bit AVR microcontroller. The microprocessor is directly
connected to the power supply using a single resistor. The sensor
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(b) Spectrogram during the booting phase of the PLC.
Figure 9: Spectral patterns of PLC instructions.
is a Tektronix MDO3034 oscilloscope with sampling rate of 1.25
GHz. Zeus provides contactless execution monitoring of commercial
PLC processors (120 MHz ARM Cortex M3 with three separate
PCB boards for I/O, logic processing, and power supply) through a
different modality (electromagnetic emanations) and using lower-
frequency sensing sampling rates (10 MHz) with more than two
orders of magnitude saving on the sensor cost.
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Figure 10: Example likelihood score distributions of the eval-
uated programs produced by the Freq+LSTM setting.
Another related work [39] also performs execution monitoring
and anomaly detection on IoT devices via the electromagnetic side
channel. They looks at the prominent frequency peaks in the spec-
tra of the signal segments as feature representations and models
program executions with statistical distributions. Zeus uses the
sequential neural network model to both extract discriminative fea-
tures from signal segments and model the control flow transitions
in a end to end manner. Moreover, they puts instrumentations at
all the loop nests and examines them separately while Zeus looks
at full executions without any instrumentation.
Controller program analysis. Although a few processors con-
tain a dedicated hardware unit for execution monitoring, e.g., em-
bedded trace macrocell [6], many embedded controllers lack such
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Figure 11: ROC curves of all evaluated programs. AUC of the
four settings: Freq-LSTM is 0.99, Freq-HMM is 0.83, Time-
LSTM is 0.59, Time-HMM is 0.36.
hardware support. To analyze the software, offline control command
verification solutions [21, 34, 42] implement formal methods to ver-
ify the safety of the control code immediately before it is executed
on the PLC. They face scalability problem, caused by state-space
explosion [24, 33, 34, 41]. Consequently, every control logic upload
request by the operators, including the emergency cases, should
wait for possibly minutes, hours, or more before the code is fully
verified for PLC execution. Such delays are often unacceptable for
real-time safety-critical control system operations.
Information security approaches. The related work to pro-
tect the control networks’ trusted computing base (TCB) are in-
sufficient as software patches are often applied only months after
their release [44], while new vulnerabilities are discovered on a
regular basis [3, 43]. The traditional perimeter-security tries to keep
adversaries out of the protected control system entirely. Attempts
include regulatory compliance approaches such as the NERC CIP
requirements [56] and access control [14]. Despite the promise of
information-security approaches, thirty years of precedence have
shown the near impossibility of keeping adversaries out of critical
systems [25] and less than promising results for the prospect of
addressing the security problem from the perimeter [27, 28, 36].
Embedded controllers from most major vendors [27, 57] and pop-
ular Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs) [36] have been shown to
have fundamental security flaws.
8 CONCLUSIONS
We presented Zeus, a contactless, passive, and non-intrusive con-
trol flow integrity monitoring solution for PLCs. Zeus identifies
malicious code execution through side channel analyses of the con-
troller’s electromagnetic emanation signals. Zeus’s data acquisition
is done by an electromagnetic sensor, which provides an air gap
between the trusted computing bases of the target PLC and Zeus’s
monitoring engine. Our empirical studies with commercial PLC
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Figure 12: Area under curve vs. sliding window size.
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controllers and several real application binaries show Zeus can
monitor high frequency commercial processors with low frequency
sensor sampling. Zeus can detect malicious code executions on
popular Allen Bradley PLCs with %98.9 accuracy and with zero
runtime overhead by its design.
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